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This paper investigates whether teenagers are 
educationally advantaged if their parents are educators, 
using PISA data for Great Britain and Ireland. It examines 
whether teachers’ children do better at tests of reading 
ability. The results show that children whose fathers 
teach at third level or whose mothers teach at second 
level do better and these effects are greater than effects 
of sex or family structure. The paper also analyses 
whether teenagers are more likely to be helped with their 
schoolwork if their parents are educators. In both 
countries only mothers who are educators are more likely 
to do so.  The evidence tends to suggest that where 
teenagers benefit from a parent as a teacher it is through 
specific assistance from the mother and a more general 
effect on the home environment from the father.  
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In the best of all possible worlds the educational attainment of young people 
would not depend on their socio-economic background. That this is not so is one of 
the most striking stylized facts of education around the world. There is a well-known 
positive association between the socio-economic background of parents and that of 
their children. This occurs for virtually any outcome of interest, such as education, 
education, income or occupation
1. Since education plays a vital role in individuals’ 
life chances, the strength of the intergenerational link acts to limit equality of 
opportunity and maintain existing inequalities. An important question, therefore, is 
what are the channels through which parental advantage is maintained?  
There are numerous possible mechanisms which could maintain 
intergenerational advantage from simple genetic transmission to a range of 
environmental variables include financial factors: better educated parents can afford 
more and better education for their children whether through direct costs of schooling 
or the indirect costs of moving to areas with better schools
2.  
It seems unlikely that finance can explain all of the inter-generational 
correlation. A large body of evidence summarized in Heckman and Carneiro (2003) 
strongly suggests that for the US and Great Britain, only a small proportion of young 
people (less than 8%) are credit constrained with respect to going to college i.e. very 
few cannot go because of lack of money and that the effect of family background 
works primarily through more long run factors such as providing a home environment 
that fosters cognitive and other skills and is conducive to learning. 
This suggests an important role for the home as a source of information. More 
educated parents are likely to be more aware of the value of education and how best to 
                                                 
1 See Chevalier, Denny and McMahon (2003) who document the degree of intergenerational 
educational mobility for 19 countries. The OECD(2001) report on PISA shows that better school 
performance is correlated with a measure of domestic wealth in 31 countries ‘though the extent of the 
association varies considerably, see Table 6.2 page 286. 
2 There are numerous papers documenting the price premia that attach to houses which are close to 
good schools, see Gibbons and Machin (2003) for a recent British study. 
  1acquire it than those with less education. “Value” here does not simply refer to the 
direct economic gains from education but also cultural and social benefits. In addition, 
more educated parents may simply know more, at least in an academic sense.  
So if middle class parents have “inside information” which they can pass on, 
what exactly is it and how do they do so? To get a handle on one aspect of this, this 
paper considers a particular group of parents, namely, those who are educators
3. One 
can intuitively think of several reasons why the children of teachers will do 
particularly well at school.  
Firstly, there could be a genetic explanation. If teachers are genetically more 
intelligent or have a more positive attitude to education then one would expect this to 
be passed on, at least partially, to their offspring. This paper is unable to consider 
whether there is a genetic basis for any effects but it does not seem particularly 
plausible at least given our present state of knowledge of the human genome. 
A second factor is that parents who are educators may offer specific help to 
their children by making use of their knowledge of the curriculum, the education 
system generally and their, hopefully more sophisticated, teaching abilities. Thirdly, 
leaving aside these fairly specific advantages, educators are, one expects, likely to 
instil a favourable attitude to learning at home and to facilitate their children’s 
education generally. The recent revival of interest in “social capital” has emphasized 
the importance of networks and of other forms of informal association. Clearly the 
family as a network, “familial capital” perhaps, is likely to be especially vital for 
younger individuals when they have less opportunity to enter or form other networks. 
Not surprisingly, there is a vast body of research showing the importance of family 
background and structure on educational, behavioural and other outcomes for 
children. 
Finally, teachers may make better choices with regard to their children’s 
schools. School quality has an influence on educational attainment important and 
educators are likely to have better information on school quality particularly if they 
work in the same level (primary, secondary etc) that their children are attending. The 
                                                 
3 This paper used “educators” and “teachers” synonymously i.e. those who teach at first, second or 
third level. 
  2effect of school quality, for example as measured by class size, teacher qualifications 
on educational attainment has not generated a consensus, Heckman and Masterov 
(2005) provide a recent overview. They argue that school quality effects do matter, 
specifically that better teachers improve educational outcomes, but that policies to 
reduce class size are unlikely to be effective.  
The importance of any school quality effects depends on the extent to which 
parents have choice over which schools to send their children and on the extent to 
which information on school quality is publicly available. For example extensive 
information is available on English schools through the schools inspectorate, 
OFSTED which publishes whole school reviews and the Department for Education 
and Skills which publishes school “league tables”. In Ireland by contrast, no 
information on school outcomes, whether qualitative or quantitative, is available
4. 
However, aside from the type of data that can be included in such sources, informal 
knowledge about schools may be important and access to such information is likely to 
be very unequal since such knowledge tends to be transmitted through informal 
networks, “social capital” in contemporary parlance. It seems plausible that education 
professionals will in general be better informed than many other parents and this 
inequity is exacerbated when other information is censored. 
With regard to choice, the education systems are quite different in Great 
Britain and Ireland. Education is devolved to Local Education Authorities with 
defined catchment areas for state schools. In Ireland the education system is 
controlled by central government and parents are somewhat freer in sending their 
children to schools outside their immediate locality. In both countries there is a 
significant private school sector with the dividing line between private and public 
schools less well defined in Ireland. For example all teachers, including those 
teaching at private schools, have their salaries paid by the state and hence are required 
to have the same qualifications as those at state schools.  
                                                 
4 See www.ofsted.gov.uk  an d www.dfes.gov.uk/performancetables/ for data on England. Links to 
similar data for other countries can be found at www.ucd.ie/economic/staff/kdenny/Schooldata.htm . In 
Ireland, the Education Act of 1998 gives the Minister for Education the right to refuse to publish any 
information that would make permit comparisons of schools, a right that has been consistently 
exercised.  
 
  3This paper attempts to measure the educational benefit, if any, to children of 
having parents who are teachers. This is done this in two ways. Firstly the paper 
estimates models explaining the students’ scores on reading tests including indicators 
of whether their parents are educators while controlling for a wide range of covariates. 
Secondly models of the frequency with which the respondents are helped with their 
schoolwork by their parents are estimated; again with indicators of whether their 
parents are educators and controlling for a wide range of covariates.  
I am unable to locate any other research on these or similar lines. An 
analogous question would be whether the health of the children of physicians differs 
from those of non-physicians. While there is a considerable research literature on how 
physicians and their families interact with healthcare systems, whether their children’s 
health is better on average is unclear from the results
5. 
In comparing the results across two countries not only must one remember that 
the education system is different but so too is the labour market for teachers. Teaching 
may well attract different types of individuals in two countries depending on the 
incentives to join the profession and the ease with which one can do. It is not possible 
here to make a comparison of the market for teachers in Ireland and Great Britain
6. 
Some useful information can be gleaned from a recent OECD Education at a Glance 
report that shows that after 15 years of experience a primary or secondary teacher in 
Britain earns about 46% more than Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
whereas the comparable figure in Ireland is 23%
7.  
The absolute levels of salaries (taking account of Purchasing Power Parity) are 
very similar so it is largely higher GDP per capita in Ireland that is the cause of this. 
However Gross National Product (GNP) provides a better indicator of standard of 
living than GDP and in 2003 GNP in Ireland was 72% of GDP whereas in Great 
Britain it was 94% so the OECD comparison significantly exaggerates the difference 
between the relative living standards of teachers
8.  
                                                 
5 See for example Wasserman, Hassuk, Young and Land(1989) or Richards (1999) 
6 Chevalier and Dolton (2005) describe the labour market for teachers in Britain. I am unaware of a 
comparable analysis for Ireland. 
7 OECD (2003) Table D5.1, data refers to 2001. 
8  www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html : World Bank Development Indicators.  
 
  42 Data and estimation methods 
 
The data used here is drawn from the Program for International Student 
Assessment (PISA), which collected data on students’ performance in reading, 
mathematical and scientific ability as well as an extensive array of contextual 
information at the level of the student and of the school. It was collected by the 
OECD in 2000 and released in 2001. A further wave collected in 2003 has been 
released this year. Data on 32 countries in all are available; the total number of 
observations is 174,896. The average sample size is around 5,000 per country though 
the median is somewhat smaller with Canada and Great Britain having particularly 
large samples. The data is cross sectional and this of course imposes limits on the 
analysis. It is not possible to allow for dynamics of any form, for example to analyse 
the effects of changes in the independent variables over time nor is it possible to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity as one could with longitudinal/panel data. It 
would be useful if, in our data, one could track the consequences for children as their 
parents enter or leave the teaching profession. 
This paper uses the data from Ireland and Great Britain (that is England, 
Scotland and Wales). The students sampled were almost all 15 years old at the time, a 
small number being slightly older or younger. All students were tested for reading 
abilities assessed in three dimensions: retrieving information, interpreting information 
and reflecting and evaluating information. These in turn are aggregated into an overall 
reading score. A subset was also tested for mathematical ability and another, partly 
overlapping, subset tested for knowledge of science. 
The main outcome of interest is the students’ performance on the average 
score on the reading test. Some results on behavioural outcomes will also be 
presented. The first model to be estimated for each country is: 
 
 Yis is s is Log X Z u β δ =+ +          ( 1 )  
 
where  Log Yis is the natural logarithm of the reading score of the i’th student 
in the s’th school,  Xis is a vector of observations on the variables of interest and on a 
  5set of control variables.  Zs is a set of dummy variables indicating the school they 
attended. Estimation is by Ordinary Least Squares and the estimated standard errors 
are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity using the standard Huber/White 
“sandwich” estimator. The logarithmic transformation of the reading score is used 
because one can interpret the estimated coefficients as giving marginal proportionate 
effects. Using a linear specification of the dependent variable leads to qualitatively 
similar results. 
In PISA, the data on reading scores are collected in the form of five “plausible 
values”, five scores that are equally likely. The dependent variable is the mean of the 
five although one could use just any one score. Sampling weights, provided with the 
data at the level of the individual student, are utilised in estimating both sets of 
models. The sampling procedure is based on a two-stage process with the school 
being the primary sampling unit so observations should be independent between but 
not necessarily within school. One method to correct the estimated standard errors 
(which are otherwise likely to be underestimated) is to use the jack-knife estimator. 
This is somewhat cumbersome so this paper estimates the covariance matrix allowing 
for clustering at the level of the individual school
9.  
In section 3 we estimate ordered probit models in which the dependent 
variable is a categorical variable indicating the frequency with which respondents are 
helped with schoolwork. It is assumed that there is an underlying score which is a 
linear combination of the independent variables and a set of cut-off or threshold 
points. The probability of observing outcome i is equal to the probability that the 
estimate of the linear function, plus a random error term, is within the range of 
estimated cut-off points: 
 
1 Pr( ) Pr( )            1...I ji j j i outcome i X u i γ βγ − == < +≤ =                           (2) 
 
X here denotes a matrix of observations on the variables of interest as well as 
control variables (including school effects) and β is a vector of parameters to be 
  6estimated. The error term u j is assumed to be normally distributed and the model is 
estimated using conventional Maximum Likelihood methods
10. Where there are I 
possible outcomes, the cut-off points γ1 ,  γ 2…  γ I-1 are estimated and  γ 0, γ I  are taken 
as   , −∞  ∞ respectively. Assuming the error term to have a logistic distribution leads 
to ordered logit which usually leads to very similar results. 
 A useful way of thinking of these ordered response models is that there is an 
underlying latent variable – in this case the true frequency of receiving help- which is 
not observed in the data and which is assumed to be a linear function of the X’s. If a 
particular parameter in β is estimated to be positive, this means that an increase in the 
corresponding X shifts the distribution of the latent variable to the right.  
This has unambiguous effects on the probability of the two extreme 
categories: the first (leftmost) falls and the last increases. However the probabilities of 
the intermediate outcomes can go up or down and need to be numerically evaluated
11.  
Specifically the marginal effect of a change in a variable Xk on each of the 
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where f(.) is the normal density function. What one can say, is that “high” 
values of the dependent variable become more likely and “low” values less likely. 
However which categories of the dependent variable count as  “high” and “low” is an 
empirical issue. Assume for example there are five categories: it could be the case that 
                                                                                                                                            
9 This paper follows Schnepf (2002) who also uses the PISA data and finds that the “clustering” 
approach followed here leads to very similar results to the jack-knife method. 
10 The ordered probit model was introduced by Aitchison and Silvey (1957) 
11 Greene (2000) pp 877-878 states the problem clearly and questions the usefulness of the estimated 
coefficients in ordered probit. Some statistical software, such as Stata, allows one to calculate average 
marginal effects. 
  7the first two become less likely and the last three become more likely or it could be 
the first three and last two and so on.  
For any two variables in a given model, the scale factor in (3) is common so 
one can compare the relative size of the marginal effects of two variables on the 
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The two equations, (1) and (2) are estimated separately. However one could 
argue that they should be estimated jointly and that each dependent variable should 
feature on the left hand side of the other equation. Students with lower scores are 
more likely to receive help from their parents and those who receive help are likely to 
get higher scores, other things being equal. If one includes the outcomes in (2) on the 
right hand side of (1) one estimates well determined negative coefficients reflecting, 
presumably, parents’ greater willingness to help their children with lower ability. 
While the non-linearity in (2) means that neither equation is nested in the other, to 
estimate the equations as a system plausibly, requires identifying assumptions and, 
rich though the dataset is, there are no convincing exclusion restrictions. For this 
reason they are estimated separately. 
PISA is an unusually rich data source so there are a large number of potential 
control variables. I include controls for sex, family structure, sibship size and several 
measures of whether the home environment is likely to be “education friendly”. 
Direct measures of parental education and parental occupation are also included. The 
information on parental occupation is provided by the student and is then coded 
according to the ISCO 1988 classification to 4-digit level. Broadly speaking the first 
digit is a decreasing indicator of occupational prestige, so 2 represents professionals 
and 9 (the omitted category) represents labourers for example.  
Educators are represented by the first two digits 23, the third digit indicates 
whether primary, secondary and third level. A further category of “education 
                                                 
12 See Stewart(2004) for example. The extension to discrete independent variables is straightforward. 
  8professionals” (including school inspectors) exists in the data but they are few in 
number and their inclusion does not change the results. The fourth digit provides 
some further detail. Because of small cell sizes no use will be made of 4-digit detail.  
Descriptive statistics are given in Tables 1 and 2. One feature worth noting from 
Table 1 is that that teaching at secondary and especially primary level is much more 
common amongst women whereas the reverse is true at third level. 
 
3 The effects on reading scores 
 
There are several ways in which young people’s education might be associated 
from having a parent as an educator since clearly educators differ from other parents 
in a number of respects which are not necessarily due to them being educators per se. 
By controlling for these confounding factors, for example their education level, one 
can rule out some spurious explanations for the association. For each of the two 
countries, a series of models is presented. The first model includes only binary 
variables, for each parent, indicating whether they teach at primary, secondary an 
third level. The second model adds controls for school effects: the Z’s in (1). This will 
reflect the extent to which children are in better or worse schools. In the third column 
controls for parental education and occupation are added – no data on parental income 
is available.  
For occupation, there are nine categories corresponding to the first digit of the 
ISCO classification. To save space, only the parameter estimates for the category to 
which teachers belong (professionals) are included in the tables. The omitted category 
is “labourer”. For parental education, data is provided using the OECD’s ISCED 
classification in six categories (five in Ireland). Again to save space, only the 
coefficient for graduates is included. The omitted category is “did not go to school”. 
The final column adds a range of variable pertaining to either the individual student or 
his/her family. Clearly the order in which variables are added as one moves from 
specific to general is somewhat arbitrary. 
Looking at the results for Ireland in Table 3, the first column indicates a strong 
association between having either parent as an educator (at any level) and 
  9performance on reading tests. The typical marginal effect is around 10% and for a 
father being a third level educator the effect is 14%. All are statistically significant at 
least at the 5% level and are quite large in magnitude. Controlling for school effects 
changes the picture however. While all but one of the effects remains statistically 
significant the magnitudes are reduced, typically by around 3 percentage points. 
Moreover while the first model only explained 2% of the variation in the dependent 
variable, this rises to almost 20% once schools effects are added. 
Adding controls for occupational grouping and education in the third column 
has the most dramatic effect on the results. Only two of the parameters of interest, 
mother as secondary teacher and father as a third level educator, remain statistically 
significant. The sizes of the effects are also smaller at about 6%. One can see that 
much of the apparently large effect of the teacher variables was due to the 
occupational grouping to which they belong: having a father who is a professional 
raises one’s test score by almost 9% and the equivalent figure for one’s mother is just 
over 6%. Having a father who is a third level graduate also conveys a large premium 
on the child’s reading score, almost 13%. 
Adding the final set of six controls which largely relate to the home 
environment do not change the results fundamentally aside from further lowering the 
effect of the mother as secondary teacher to about 4%. Many of the other coefficients 
are as one expects: girls do better, children with more siblings do worse as they have 
more competition for family resources and the number of books in this house has a 
strong association with higher test scores
13. Of course this result does not mean that 
parents can boost their children’s school performance by simply investing in large 
quantities of books. Rather, it should be interpreted as an indicator of a home 
environment that is conducive to education. The cultural communication variable is 
                                                 
13 The data in PISA on number of books is based on a categorical variable with 7 ranges. For simplicity 
this was converted to a scalar by using the mid-points of the ranges. For the top category, 500+ , I 
chose 600 as a mid point. Since this procedure introduces measurement error the estimated coefficient 
is likely to be underestimated. Using dummy variables for the categories generates very minor changes 
in the parameters of interest. 
  10an index based on the frequency with which the respondents engage with their parents 
in a variety of ways
14.  
Intuitively one might expect having parents as secondary school teachers to be 
the most advantageous since these students are at secondary level. This is only partly 
borne out by the results. Whether the benefit of fathers as third level educators is 
because they help their children directly or some more general effect is explored in 
section 4. 
The results for Great Britain are presented in Table 4. Perhaps the most 
striking feature of these results is that they are quite similar to those for Ireland. With 
no other controls, all the teacher variables are statistically significant and are of 
comparable magnitude to those in Table 3. Adding school effects again increases the 
proportion of the variation explained by the model by about 20% and reduces the size 
of the teacher effects by a few percentage points. Including the additional controls 
leaves one with similar results to those in Ireland: having a father as a third level 
teacher and a mother at second level has well determined effects on the dependent 
variable. The sizes of these two effects are almost the same as in Ireland, about 5% 
and 3.5% respectively. The only difference is that there is also a benefit to having a 
father who is a second level teacher.  
While the effect sizes in Tables 3 and 4 may seem small in absolute 
magnitude, when they are compared to some of the other coefficients in the table the 
picture is changed. For example, from column 4 in Table 3, one can see that the 
benefit of having a father as a third level teacher (+6.8%) is almost twice the 
disadvantage associated with being a boy (-3.8%). In Great Britain, having a mother 
who is a secondary teacher more than compensates for the disadvantage of being from 
a single parent household (+3.6%, -2.7% respectively).             
Why the results should be so similar across countries is not clear. The two 
educational systems are quite different in most respects, for example the degree of 
local control, financing of schools, student assessment. It is arguable, then, that the 
commonality of the results arises from similarities in intra-family relations between 
                                                 
14 Specifically: on the frequency with which they discuss political or social issues, discuss film, books 
or television or listen to classical music together, see OECD(2002) p31. 
  11the two countries. It would be interesting to repeat this exercise on some of the other 
twenty countries in the PISA data many of which have very different social and 
familial traditions. 
If there was a general benefit from having a parent as an educator due to there 
being an education-friendly environment at home, one would expect this to be true 
whatever level the parent taught at. If the benefit was “specific” in the sense that it 
depended on direct knowledge of the curriculum then one would expect it to depend 
on the level at which the parent taught. It seems plausible that the effect would be 
greatest for secondary teachers since the students are at that level. It is arguable that it 
would be greater for primary teachers than those at third level since many of the latter 
are primarily interested in research rather than teaching per se and they rarely possess 
any significant degree of training in teaching. These arguments are only partly borne 
out by the results. The absence of any effect from primary teachers is surprising 
‘though there are very few males in this category. 
There is no obvious explanation for the differences between the effects of 
fathers and mothers. It may be that one parent has more time to help their offspring. It 
seems plausible that even when both parents are working that the mother does more of 
the housework on average: this would suggest a greater scope for paternal 
involvement in education at home. Whether this is actually true is another matter. In 
the survey students where asked how often their parents and other family members 
helped them with their schoolwork. The next section models the frequency with 
which the respondents are helped by each of their parents and how this depends on 
whether their parents are educators or not. 
4 The effects on the frequency of being helped with school work 
 
Students were asked how often they were helped with schoolwork by both of 
their parents. The choices available to the respondents were: never or hardly ever, a 
few times a year, about once a month, several times a year, several times a week. The 
marginal distributions are given below in Table 2. The determinants of this variable 
are modelled using ordered probit. 
  12The same controls are used as in the models of students’ reading ability. In 
modelling each parent’s frequency of helping, indicators of both parents’ occupation 
are included since there may be some substitution between the two. Looking at Table 
5 one can see that in both countries, that fathers are as likely to help their sons as their 
daughters whereas mothers are more likely to help their daughters. The coefficients of 
interest are the first six parameters. In Ireland, being a teacher at any level has no 
statistically significant influence on whether a father helps their offspring at school. 
By contrast, whether the mother teaches at first, second or third level makes them 
more likely to help. For neither parent is there any evidence of substitution effects: 
whether the other parent is an educator is irrelevant. 
If one considers the occupational grouping effects, there is a rather curious 
result
15. Whether a father is professional or not has no effect on whether they help 
their children but they are less likely to do so if the mother is a professional. The 
converse is also true for mothers; that is each parent puts in less effort when the other 
parent has a relatively high status job. Presumably this is because as there is a higher 
opportunity cost to their time they need to spend more time in other household duties 
and hence have less time to help their children. The older a student is the less likely 
they are to get help and in Great Britain a higher number of siblings also had this 
effect. The age effect is striking because there is very little variation in the 
respondents’ ages. Even teenagers who are a few months older are less likely to be 
helped by either parent. Two indicators of having an environment that is conducive to 
education, the number of books in the house and the index of cultural communication 
are consistently associated with a greater frequency of help while single parenthood 
has, not surprisingly, the opposite effect
16.  
Using equation (4) one can see that in Ireland, having a mother as a secondary 
teacher has a 6% bigger effect on the probability of any given outcome than if the 
mother is at third level (1.06=0.688/0.648) where as in Great Britain, the 
corresponding figure is close to  –20%  (0.81=0.363/0.449).  
                                                 
15 As in Tables 3 and 4, the other occupational and parental education effects have been omitted for the 
table.  
16 The effects of single parenthood on children has been widely studied, for example Carlson and 
Corcoran (2001). 
  13Can these results help one interpret the results in Table 3? No simple 
explanation is possible: the beneficial effects on literacy of a father at third level does 
not appear to be as a result of direct assistance with school work so this suggests that 
there is some more general influence at work. Mothers who are educators spend more 
time helping their children, but it results in better academic performance only if they 
are secondary teachers. It is possible that it results in better performance in 
dimensions not studied here such as mathematics or science.  
An alternative explanation is the mothers choose whom to help partly on the 
basis of their general academic ability. If they are more likely to help their children if 
they are academically weaker then one may observe no effect in the data since 
effectively the maternal help acts to compensate for a variable that is not observed in 
the data, their innate ability. Estimating the two outcomes (equations (1) and (2)) 
simultaneously might throw some light on this issue but it is unclear how one could 
do this credibly with the data available. 
Turning to the results for Great Britain, one finds that, as in section 3, they are 
very similar to those for Ireland. Being an educator at any level has no influence on 
whether a father helps their offspring at school whereas if the mother teaches this 
makes them more likely to help. Where children benefit from having a father as an 
educator it does not appear to be because of direct assistance with school-work. 
Mothers as educators are more likely to assist their children but it is not always 
associated with better reading scores.  
It was shown earlier that parents in general are more likely to help their 
children if the other parent has a high status job and this suggests that demands on 
parental time may be a constraint on helping children. The negative effects of single 
parenthood and sibship size also point in this direction. If this were the case then one 
would expect the labour market status of parents to have an effect. However it was 
found in the preliminary analysis of the data that whether a parent was full or part-
time employed or a home-maker made little difference and these variables were 
therefore excluded from the final analysis so a simple time constraint argument is not 
supported.  
 
  145 Conclusions 
 
The extent to which the academic achievement of young people is determined 
by their parents’ socio-economic background provides, to some extent, a barometer of 
the degree of educational and social mobility in a society. That the children of the 
better off or more educated do better in school and in life in general is well 
established but the relationship between the two is in many respects a black box: there 
can be many reasons why advantage is transmitted across generations. It is difficult to 
identify the separate roles of parental income and education, familial influences on 
attitudes, neighbourhood effects and school quality as they are highly correlated. 
This paper looks at one particular strand within the black box by investigating 
whether children are advantaged if their parents are teachers and if so, through what 
mechanism. There are well determined, ‘though quantitatively small, advantages to 
having a parent as an educator principally if the parent is a second level teacher or the 
father is a third level educator. The size of the effects are, however comparable and in 
many cases greater than other sources of educational inequality such as sex 
differences or living in a single parent household, variables which have been very 
widely studied.  
The evidence points to benefits that are partly specific, arising from direct help 
from a parent/teacher and partly a more general effect, likely to be associated with 
providing a more education-friendly household. When we examine specifically 
whether educators help their children with schoolwork, the results are broadly in line 
with this. Only mothers who are educators (at any level) help their children more and 
this explains some of the higher reading scores. Since the fathers are no more helpful 
than non-educators, the advantage they provide to their children must be through 
some other means such as contributing to a more pro-education environment above 
and beyond that which is controlled for in the estimation. That the results are very 
similar for two countries, Great Britain and Ireland, with very different educational 
systems suggests it is commonalities within the family that are at work. 
  15Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Ireland  Great  Britain 
 Mean  Std.Dev.  Mean  Std.Dev 
Reading score  530.032 90.738 533.873  95.502
Log of reading score  6.257 0.184 6.263  0.193
Mother primary teacher  0.032 0.176 0.047  0.211
Father primary teacher  0.005 0.067 0.005  0.074
Mother secondary teacher  0.021 0.143 0.026  0.158
Father secondary teacher  0.017 0.128 0.019  0.137
Mother 3
rd level teacher  0.003 0.053 0.008  0.089
Father 3
rd level teacher  0.006 0.075 0.011  0.104
Father graduate  0.273 0.446 0.360  0.480
Mother graduate  0.276 0.447 0.404  0.491
Father professional  0.099 0.298 0.157  0.364
Mother professional  0.181 0.385 0.211  0.408
Girl 0.523 0.500 0.507  0.500
Age 15.699 0.284 15.638  0.288
Number of siblings  2.590 1.393 2.023  1.328
Log (number of books)  4.447 1.435 4.492  1.438
Single parent family  0.094 0.291 0.147  0.354
Parental cultural communication  -0.082 0.957 0.019  0.917
       
N 3555  7721 
Note: The descriptive statistics in Tables 1 and 2 are unweighted. The sample is for that used in column 







Table 2: Frequency with which parents help their children with schoolwork 
 Ireland  Great  Britain 
  Father helps  Mother helps  Father helps  Mother helps 
Never/hardly ever  1427       41%  1247        35%  2239        30%  1856     25% 
A few times a year   872        25%   888         25%  1305        18%  1214     16% 
About once a month   496        14%   545         15%  1336        18%  1484     20% 
Several times a month   488        14%   559         16%  1571        21%  1808     25% 
Several times a week   224          6%   298           8%   900         12%  1013     14% 
Total  3507        100  3537         100  7351        100  7375     100 
Note: Theses tabulations are for the samples used in the models in Table 5. Percentages may not add 
up due to rounding. 
  
  16Table 3: Results for Ireland 
Dependent variable: log of reading score  
1 2 3 4 
Mother primary teacher  0.056 0.034 0.002 -0.001 
3.23** 1.98*  0.12  0.09 
Father primary teacher  0.098 0.094 0.05  0.047 
2.49* 2.70**  1.29  1.41 
Mother secondary teacher  0.117 0.091 0.059 0.039 
7.17** 5.32** 3.50** 2.38* 
Father secondary teacher  0.095 0.071 0.03  0.02 
5.52** 3.67** 1.39  0.93 
Mother 3
rd level teacher  0.098 0.055 0.028 -0.005 
2.18*  1.37 0.72 0.11 
Father 3
rd level teacher  0.138 0.097 0.062 0.068 
5.27** 3.70** 2.13*  2.23* 
Father graduate    0.128  0.104 
  2.77**  2.47* 
Mother graduate    0.068  0.038 
  1.45  0.77 
Father professional    0.091  0.074 
  5.28**  4.39** 
Mother professional    0.068  0.052 
  6.79**  5.36** 
Girl     0.038 
   4.26** 
Age     0.042 
   3.56** 
Number of siblings     -0.011 
   4.65** 
Log (number of books)     0.025 
   10.20** 
Single parent family     -0.013 
   1.26 
Parental cultural communication    0.013 
   3.67** 
Parental education effects  No No Yes  Yes 
Occupational effects  No No Yes  Yes 
School effects  No  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  6.247 6.249 5.961 5.268 
924.15** 8674.66**  95.65**  26.68** 
      
Observations  3555 3555 3555 3555 
R-squared  0.02 0.19 0.24 0.29 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Regressions are 
weighted. 
  17Table 4: Results for Great Britain 
Dependent variable: log of reading score 
1 2  3  4 
Mother primary teacher  0.103 0.067  0.026  0.016 
8.43** 4.95**  1.69  1.07 
Father primary teacher  0.049 0.015  -0.011  -0.01 
2.24* 0.4  0.34  0.35 
Mother secondary teacher  0.127 0.086  0.047  0.036 
8.31** 5.96**  2.96**  2.20* 
Father secondary teacher  0.104 0.08  0.052  0.054 
4.83** 5.08**  2.80**  2.56* 
Mother 3
rd level teacher  0.091 0.041  0.011  0.007 
4.15** 1.81  0.46  0.28 
Father 3
rd level teacher  0.134 0.086  0.05  0.049 
5.26** 3.43**  1.94  2.06* 
Father graduate     0.026  0.009 
   0.47  0.16 
Mother graduate     0.061  0.04 
   0.93  0.61 
Father professional     0.093  0.073 
   6.66**  5.58** 
Mother professional     0.099  0.084 
   7.16**  6.27** 
Girl       0.037 
     6.41** 
Age       0.025 
     2.32* 
Number of siblings       -0.006 
     2.56* 
Log (number of books)       0.022 
     8.50** 
Single parent family       -0.027 
     3.75** 
Parental cultural communication      0.021 
     5.39** 
Parental education effects  No No  Yes  Yes 
Occupational effects  No No  Yes  Yes 
School effects  No Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  6.249 6.253  6.041  5.599 
878.17** 7193.46** 128.01**  33.76** 
        
Observations  7721 7721  7721  7721 
R-squared  0.04 0.24  0.3  0.34 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Regressions are 
weighted. 
 
  18Table 5: Modelling the frequency of being helped by a parent 
 Ireland  Great  Britain 
  Father helps  Mother helps  Father helps  Mother helps
Mother primary teacher  0.118  0.439  0.058  0.19 
 1.01  3.85**  0.6  1.9 
Father primary teacher  0.144  -0.3  0.216  0.214 
  0.52  0.88 1.37 1.53 
Mother secondary teacher  0.011  0.688  0.019  0.363 
 0.09  4.46**  0.15  2.93** 
Father secondary teacher  0.333  -0.214  0.058  0.1 
  1.79  1.25 0.53 0.62 
Mother 3
rd level teacher  0.352  0.648  0.277  0.449 
 1.04  2.81**  1.62  2.88** 
Father 3
rd level teacher  0.163  0.08  0.082  0.051 
  0.68  0.38 0.44 0.32 
Father graduate  0.812  -0.144  1.121  0.253 
 2.52*  0.5  4.00**  1.23 
Mother graduate  -0.644  0.36  -0.219  0.762 
  2.69**  0.81 0.97 3.03** 
Father professional  0.088  -0.239  0.109  -0.296 
 0.83  2.46*  1.43  3.52** 
Mother  professional  -0.203  -0.198 -0.105 -0.096 
 2.78**  2.45*  1.33  1.31 
Girl  0.066  0.146 0.035 0.204 
 1.08  2.50*  0.83  5.45** 
Age  -0.366  -0.366 -0.225 -0.332 
  5.60**  5.28** 3.63** 4.78** 
Number of siblings  -0.002  0.014  -0.038  -0.027 
 0.12  0.91  2.35*  1.61 
Log (number of books)  0.044  0.03  0  0.024 
  2.73**  1.78 0.01 1.51 
Single parent family  -0.487  -0.15  -0.515  -0.11 
 5.83**  2.24*  8.46**  2.13* 
Parental cultural communication 0.318  0.275  0.297  0.282 
  11.8**  10.24** 12.17** 12.99** 
       
Parental  education  effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational  effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
School  effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  3507  3537 7351 7375 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The dependent variable ranges from 1 to 5 indicating the frequency with which each parent helps the 
respondent at school, 1 being “hardly ever” and 5 being “several times a week”, see Table 2. 
Estimation is by maximum-likelihood ordered probit. 
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